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COMMENTS
THE BATTLE OVER U.S. WATER:
WHY THE CLEAN WATER RULE
“FLOWS” WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
ASHLEIGH ALLIONE*
For close to thirty years, the U.S. government and courts have struggled to
determine the scope of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). The CWA is the primary
federal statute that regulates pollution of our nation’s waters, vaguely defined
by Congress as the “waters of the United States.” A body of water defined as a
“water of the United States” is subject to the Act’s jurisdiction and permit
requirements. On June 29, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency and
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a long-awaited rule—the Clean Water
Rule—redefining the “waters of the United States.” This Rule has led to
widespread controversy among landowners, state governments, and
environmental groups who are challenging its validity and scope. At one
extreme, landowners are concerned about increased federal regulation over
private property and the need for costly permits prior to development or use; at
the other, environmental groups contend that the Rule is not strong enough to
protect our nation’s crucial waterways from pollution. This Comment
analyzes the Clean Water Rule and argues that it falls within the permissible
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scope of CWA jurisdiction and comports with Supreme Court precedent. This
Comment further contends that the Rule was a good faith attempt to
streamline the permit process and provide the public with increased clarity on
the scope of the “waters of the United States.”
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently engaged in a nationwide battle over
how to define the “waters of the United States.”1 On June 29, 2015,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (“Corps” and together with the EPA, the
“Agencies”) jointly published the much-anticipated final Clean Water
Rule that defines the “waters of the United States”—a term that
determines the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act
(CWA).2 Following its publication, the Rule has faced nationwide
criticism from state and local officials, businesses, associations, and
environmental advocates who have questioned the Rule’s legality and
claimed that the Rule constitutes federal overreach.3 While disputes
about water ownership and use have existed since our nation’s
founding, this particular controversy has become the most
contentious water debate for close to half a century.4
The Clean Water Rule (“the Rule”), also commonly referred to as
the “WOTUS”5 Rule, will replace the existing definition in the
Agencies’ regulations, which has been in effect for more than twentyfive years.6 The Rule seeks to clarify which waters are protected
under the CWA and thus fall within the Agencies’ regulatory
1. See Susan K. Hori, New “Waters of the US” Rule on Hold: Enduring Debate Creates
Uncertainty for Developers, ENVTL. LEADER (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.environmentalle
ader.com/2015/12/14/new-waters-of-the-us-rule-on-hold-enduring-debate-createsuncertainty-for-developers (chronicling the interpretation of the phrase “waters of
the United States” since 1985).
2. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
3. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43943, EPA AND THE ARMY
CORPS’ “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” RULE: CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AND OPTIONS
1 (2016) [hereinafter COPELAND, R43943], https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R439
43.pdf (noting that critics argue that the Rule’s vagueness opens the door for
increased regulatory jurisdiction).
4. See Jeremy P. Jacobs & Annie Snider, “Mr. Clean Water Act” Faces Biggest
Challenge, GREENWIRE (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060025570
(“I personally, in 30 years, have never experienced anything like this. . . . I’m not sure
the division has. I’m not sure the Department of Justice has. So many challenges in
district courts to the same agency action. And so many challenges in courts of
appeals.” (quoting Department of Justice Attorney Steve Samuels)).
5. WOTUS is an abbreviation for “waters of the United States.” Id.
6. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43455, EPA AND THE ARMY
CORPS’ RULE TO DEFINE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 1 (2016) [hereinafter
For the
COPELAND, R43455], https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43455.pdf.
Agencies’ definition of “waters of the United States” used between November 13,
1986, and August 27, 2015, see generally 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1986) (Corps); 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2 (1986) (EPA).

ALLIONE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

148

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/31/2016 8:03 PM

[Vol. 66:145

authority, or jurisdiction. If a body of water is determined to be a
“water of the United States,” the Agencies may require businesses and
individuals to obtain federal CWA permits prior to development or
use.7 The Rule defines several types of protected waters for the first
time and redefines categories of waters that the Agencies previously
considered jurisdictional on a case-by-case basis.8 As a result, the Rule
expands federal jurisdiction over some categories of water and could
increase determinations that a body of water is a “water of the United
States,” subject to federal regulation, by three to five percent.9
Consequently, the Rule’s new definition has raised fears about
increased permit requirements and federal regulation over water on
private property and intrastate land.10 The concerns surrounding the
Rule stem from the facts that (1) federal CWA permit applications
are time-consuming and costly and (2) failure to obtain a permit
before discharging pollutants into jurisdictional waters may result in
civil and criminal liability that carries potentially substantial fines.11
Landowners, companies, and state governments have expressed
concerns about the potential for increased costs associated with
agriculture, development, or state projects near waters newly
protected under the Rule because they would need to comply with
CWA permit requirements or risk liability.12
7. COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 1. The Rule defines the “waters of the
United States” for all CWA regulatory programs that use this term. Id. at 2.
However, this Comment will focus on the Rule’s impact on the section 404 regulatory
program. See infra text accompanying notes 56–62 (explaining the EPA and Corps’
regulatory permit programs).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 169–83 (explaining the changes in the Rule).
9. COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 11.
10. See Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s Water War, POLITICO (May 27, 2015, 10:41 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule-118319
(declaring that “the federal government shouldn’t be regulating puddles on private
property” and describing the Rule as “a raw and tyrannical power grab” that will lead
“to a regulatory and economic hell”).
11. See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text (describing the costs associated
with section 404 permits); see, e.g., Jeremy P. Jacobs, Regulatory Showdown in Calif.
Wheat Field, E&E REP. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060031808
(providing a first-hand account of the Rule’s potential liability implications).
12. See Timothy Benson, Sixth Circuit Provides Bridge over Troubled WOTUS, HILL:
CONGRESS BLOG (Oct. 28, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/e
nergy-environment/258287-sixth-circuit-provides-bridge-over-troubled-wotus
(explaining that the Rule leads to increased restrictions, red tape, and costs if an
owner’s land protected by the Rule is minimally altered and commenting that the
Rule leads to a “usurpation of states’ authority”); COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at
1 (discussing the reaction of state and local officials who are concerned about the
Rule affecting their own infrastructure projects).

ALLIONE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE BATTLE OVER U.S. WATER

10/31/2016 8:03 PM

149

The CWA, enacted in 1972, is the primary federal statute
regulating pollution of the U.S. waterways.13 The CWA granted the
federal government the authority to regulate the discharge of
pollutants into “navigable waters,” which Congress broadly defined as
the “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”14 The
Agencies were left to define the scope of the “waters of the United
States” in future regulations.15 The Agencies have always had the
authority to regulate traditional navigable waters—waters used or
with the capacity for use in commerce.16 However, the Agencies and
courts have struggled to determine how far CWA jurisdiction extends
to non-navigable streams, wetlands, and adjacent waters that are not
directly connected to traditional navigable waters.17 These nonnavigable and adjacent waters account for approximately sixty
percent of our nation’s streams and wetlands, leading to inconsistent
application of the CWA among Agency officials and to confusion
among the regulated public.18
Confusion about CWA jurisdiction continued following three
United States Supreme Court cases that ambiguously interpreted the
scope of the CWA: United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,19 Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers20
(“SWANCC”), and the most recent case, Rapanos v. United States.21 The
Court failed to reach a majority decision in Rapanos, which addressed
CWA jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries.22
This decision led to two standards that the Agencies and courts have

13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (CWA), Pub. L.
No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)).
14. CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
15. COPELAND, R43943, supra note 3, at 3; see supra note 6 (discussing the
regulations passed by the Corps and EPA in 1986).
16. ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW, POLICY,
AND POLITICS 38 (2011).
17. See, e.g., COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 3 (referencing the ambiguity of
the extent of the CWA’s scope of jurisdiction and supporters’ acknowledgment that
the scope needed clarification).
18. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054, 37,056 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40
C.F.R.); Factsheet: Clean Water Rule, EPA (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/producti
on/files/2015-05/documents/fact_sheet_summary_final_1.pdf [hereinafter Factsheet].
19. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
20. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
21. 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 729.
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applied to establish CWA jurisdiction.23 The plurality opinion held
that waters are jurisdictional under the CWA if they have a “continuous
surface connection” with a “water of the United States.”24 In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy created a different test, which
established CWA jurisdiction only if there is a “significant nexus”
between the two bodies of water.25 To date, there has been no
consensus on whether the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” test is the appropriate standard to find a body of
water or wetland jurisdictional as a “water of the United States.”26
In the wake of Rapanos, the EPA received hundreds of requests
from elected officials, local agency associations, nongovernmental
organizations, and businesses seeking clarification on the scope of
the “waters of the United States.”27 On April 21, 2014, the Agencies
issued a proposed rule to clarify which bodies of water they
considered to be “waters of the United States,”28 and that proposal
received over one million public comments.29 Following review of the
public comments, the final revised rule was published on June 29,
2015, and became effective on August 28, 2015.30 The Rule clarifies
23. Joshua A. Bloom & Estie A. Manchik, Defining “Significant Nexus” After
Rapanos, 39 TRENDS 1, 4 (2008).
24. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (explaining that a “continuous surface connection” occurs
when it is difficult to determine “where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins”).
25. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26. See infra Section I.C (explaining the disagreement among federal courts over
the appropriate standard post-Rapanos).
27. Persons and Organizations Requesting Clarification of “Waters of the United States” by
Rulemaking, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/persons-and-organizationsrequesting-clarification-waters-united-states-rulemaking (last visited Oct. 19, 2016)
[hereinafter EPA Requests].
28. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79
Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
29. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act,
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OW-20110880 (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) (providing access to the public comments submitted
following the Proposed Rule).
30. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40
C.F.R.). However, the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota issued an
order enjoining implementation of the Clean Water Rule the day before the Rule
was to become effective nationwide. North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047,
1060 (D.N.D. 2015). On September 4, 2015, the North Dakota District Court
confirmed that its Order only prevented implementation of the Rule in the thirteen
states—Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming—that were parties
to the litigation. Order Limiting the Scope of Preliminary Injunction to Plaintiffs,
North Dakota v. EPA, 3:15-cv-59, (D.N.D. Sept. 4, 2015), ECF No. 79. Thus, the Rule
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the CWA’s jurisdiction over this ambiguous category of waters, which
includes waters used for fishing, swimming, and wildlife habitation, as
well as streams that affect drinking water for roughly 117 million
Americans.31 Nevertheless, some environmental advocates believe
that the Rule falls short of its goals because it increases permit
exemptions and fails to protect other important categories of water,
such as groundwater.32
The Agencies insist that the scope of jurisdiction under the Rule is
actually narrower than existing regulations.33 Despite this assurance,
litigation has plagued the Rule at both the district and appellate
levels, and, on October 9, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit stayed enforcement of the Rule nationwide.34
Moreover, Congress has made several attempts to block the Rule’s
implementation.35 While this is not the first opposition that the CWA
has faced,36 the strong immediate reaction from both environmental
and industry groups following the Rule’s publication has sparked a
went into effect on August 28, 2015, for the remaining states that were not parties to
the litigation. Id.
31. Factsheet, supra note 18.
32. Tina Posterli, US EPA and Army Corps Issue Weak Clean Water Rule,
WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE (May 27, 2015), http://waterkeeper.org/us-epa-and-army-cor
ps-issue-weak-clean-water-rule (referencing arguments by environmental groups); see
also Kelli Barrett, Mixed Initial Responses to Final US Clean Water Rule, ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE (May 29, 2015), http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/mix
ed-initial-responses-to-final-us-clean-water-rule (discussing the Rule’s shortcomings).
33. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054 (noting that the Rule adds
“important qualifiers on some existing categories such as tributaries”).
34. See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015) (staying enforcement of the
Rule pending the litigation consolidated in the Sixth Circuit); In re Clean Water
Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 140 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1341
(J.P.M.L. 2015) (rejecting consolidation of nine complaints filed in district courts
nationwide); In re Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United
States,” Consolidation Order, MCP No. 135 (J.P.M.L. July 28, 2015), Dkt. No. 3
(consolidating twelve petitions for review in the Sixth Circuit).
35. See, e.g., H.R. 1732, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring, upon passage of the Act,
the withdrawal of any final rule based on the 2014 proposed rule); S.J. Res. 22, 114th
Cong. (2015) (proposing to nullify the Clean Water Rule published on June 29,
2015). On January 19, 2016, President Barack Obama vetoed Joint Resolution 22,
which would have overturned the Rule. Daniel Wilson, Senate Fails to Block Obama’s
Veto of Anti-Water Rule Bill, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2016, 11:59 AM), http://www.law360.co
m/articles/749073/senate-fails-to-block-obama-s-veto-of-anti-water-rule-bill.
The
House and Senate have not garnered enough support to override President Obama’s
veto. Id.
36. In 1972, Congress had to override a veto by President Richard Nixon to
implement the CWA. JOEL M. GROSS & KERRI L. STELCEN, BASIC PRACTICE SERIES:
CLEAN WATER ACT 7 (2d ed. 2012).
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contentious debate regarding its legality, resulting in a prolonged,
uphill battle for the Agencies.37
This Comment analyzes the Rule and argues that the Rule falls
within the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction and does not violate
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, or
Rapanos.38 Further, this Comment argues that the Rule was a good
faith effort by the Obama Administration to streamline review of the
CWA permit process and make the scope of CWA jurisdiction easier
for the public to understand. The Rule reflects Congress’s intent
behind the CWA, a combination of Supreme Court precedent, recent
science, Agency practice, and consideration of public comments.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of the CWA and the
recent Supreme Court decisions in Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and
Rapanos addressing the scope of the CWA. It also discusses the
diverse U.S. Courts of Appeals interpretations of CWA jurisdiction
following Rapanos and introduces the text of the Rule. Part II
analyzes the Rule and asserts that the Rule adopts Justice Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” standard into the definition of “waters of the
United States.” Further, Part II analyzes the Rule’s three categories
of CWA jurisdiction and argues that each of these categories
comports with the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction under
Supreme Court precedent. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
Rule provides the public with increased clarity about the scope of
jurisdictional waters under the CWA and is important to ensure
protection of our nation’s waters.
I.

HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER
THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”

The Agencies and courts have struggled to interpret the
jurisdictional scope of the CWA since its implementation. The

37. See Garret Ellison, Michigan Unique in Clean Water Rule Debate Due to 1984
Wetland Program, MLIVE MEDIA GROUP (Sept. 14, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.mlive.co
m/news/index.ssf/2015/09/clean_water_rule_michigan_wotu.html
(describing
disagreement over the Rule and the conflicting responses by the Obama
Administration, Congress, and numerous states); Jennifer Yachnin, House Republican
Compares WOTUS to Terrorism, the Plague, GREENWIRE (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060028451 (“In the farming community,
which both Republicans and Democrats represent, this is as popular as the plague, as
popular as ISIS. This is not popular at all.” (quoting Rep. Ken Calvert)).
38. This Comment will only analyze the Rule in light of the past CWA Supreme
Court cases and will not address any other constitutional arguments that have been
raised in litigation.
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development of the new Rule defining “waters of the United States”
resulted from confusion regarding three Supreme Court cases—
Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos—that ambiguously
interpreted the Agencies’ authority to regulate adjacent waters and
smaller, non-navigable streams under the CWA. This Part expounds
on the history of the CWA and the development of the Rule by
discussing the Supreme Court cases and explaining both the
Agencies’ and courts’ difficulty determining the appropriate standard
to establish CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos.
A. The History and Purpose of the Clean Water Act
The Agencies consider the CWA to be “the Nation’s single most
important statute for protecting America’s clean water against
pollution, degradation, and destruction.”39
In 1972, Congress
enacted the CWA in amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (“FWPCA”).40 The CWA’s stated objective was “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters” with the national goal “that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”41
However, this was a lofty goal given that two-thirds of our nation’s
waters had been deemed no longer safe for swimming or fishing.42
Prior to the CWA’s enactment, Congress had made numerous
attempts to regulate water pollution beginning in the 1890s.43 At that
time, Congress was focused primarily on pollution that affected
navigation.44 In 1948, in an effort to expand protection in light of
39. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054, 37,055 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40
C.F.R.).
40. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1387 (2012)).
41. CWA § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
42. Troubled Waters: A Brief History of the Clean Water Act, NOW (Dec. 20, 2002),
http://www.pbs.org/now/science/cleanwater.html (noting that in 1969, pollution of
America’s waters with discharge, such as untreated sewage, had killed record
numbers of fish and had caused bacteria levels to rise to 170 times the safe limit in
the Hudson River).
43. One of the earliest efforts of federal water regulation was the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”), which prohibited the discharge of
“refuse matter . . . flowing from streets and sewers . . . into any navigable water of the
United States” and granted authority to the Corps to regulate and issue permits.
GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 36, at 5 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 407) (describing how the
RHA became a mechanism for regulating water pollution).
44. See id. (explaining how the RHA was an attempt to reduce discharge that had
hampered the “navigable capacity” of the nation’s waters).
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increased industrialization, Congress enacted the FWPCA.45 The
FWPCA left implementation and enforcement to state-led initiatives.46
However, by 1971, only half of the states had approved water quality
standards, leaving the federal government without any enforcement
authority.47 Ultimately, observers viewed this regulatory scheme as
ineffective due to its limited scope of authority and inadequate
mechanisms of enforcement.48 Thus, in 1972, Congress comprehensively
amended the FWPCA to cover this “widening gap in federal legislation.”49
The amendments contained a “comprehensive legislative anti-pollution
scheme,” which became commonly known as the CWA.50
The CWA was a landmark congressional response to the lack of
adequate enforcement of water pollution legislation and increased
environmental awareness nationwide.51 Representatives referred to the

45. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1376). But see Heather Keith, Comment, United States v. Rapanos: Is
“Waters of the United States” Necessary for Clean Water Act Jurisdiction?, 3 SETON HALL CIR.
REV. 565, 573 (2007) (detailing that many waters were left unprotected and polluted
under the RHA’s regulatory scheme).
46. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 36, at 6 (discussing the confined supporting
role of the federal government in the 1948 FWPCA due to the delegation of
enforcement to the state level). Further, in an attempt to strengthen the FWPCA,
Congress enacted the Water Quality Act of 1965, which required “each state . . . to
develop standards for water quality within its state boundaries by July 1, 1967.” Id.
47. Id.
48. THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 1 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011)
[hereinafter CWA HANDBOOK].
49. Keith, supra note 45, at 573 (noting that the Corps could not indefinitely
expand the interpretation of its jurisdiction under the RHA to regulate water
pollution); see Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (CWA),
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387
(2012)). While the RHA had tied “the Corps[’] objectives to solely protect the
physical navigability of the nation’s waterways, the CWA expanded the Corps’ focus
to address critical issues of pollution” by including objectives that were not solely tied
to navigability. Keith, supra note 45, at 575.
50. Keith, supra note 45, at 573. In 1972, the official title of the CWA was the
“Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments”; however, after further
amendments in 1977, the law and its subsequent amendments became known as the
“Clean Water Act.” Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972) or the Clean Water Act (CWA),
BUREAU
OCEAN
ENERGY
MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/EnvironmentalStewardship/Environmental-Assessment/CWA/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
51. See GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 36, at 6–7 (detailing the degradation of the
nation’s waters and the effect of the changing national consciousness on the
implementation of the CWA). For example, several serious pollution events
occurred in 1969, including an oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, and
a fire on the polluted Cuyahoga River in Ohio. Id. at 7. A year later, the first Earth
Day took place in 1970, and in 1972 the CWA was enacted. Id.
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Act as “the most comprehensive and far-reaching water pollution bill
[Congress had] ever drafted.”52 In fact, Senator Randolph, Chairman of
the Committee on Public Works, stated that it was “perhaps the most
comprehensive legislation that the Congress of the United States has
ever developed in this particular field of the environment.”53
The CWA imposes a basic prohibition against “the discharge of any
pollutant by any person” from any “point source” into “navigable
waters” without a permit.54 One goal of the CWA’s regulatory
structure is to prevent pollutants from flowing downstream into
larger navigable waters.55 Accordingly, the CWA established two main
permit programs for discharging pollutants into “navigable waters.”56
First, section 402 of the CWA established the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which authorizes the EPA to
regulate permits allowing the “discharge of any pollutant.”57 Second,
section 404 requires a permit “for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters.”58 The Corps oversees the section
404 permit program, but the EPA and the Corps both implement the
For example, the Agencies issue joint regulations
section.59
pertaining to section 404, and the EPA has the ability to override a

52. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 179 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (statement of Rep. Mizell) (citing 1 CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 369 (1973)).
53. Id. (citing 2 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1269 (1973)).
54. CWA § 301(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The “discharge of a pollutant” is defined
to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”
CWA § 502(12); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Further, a “pollutant” includes dredged
material, rock, sand, sewage, or industrial and agricultural waste. CWA § 502(6); 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2015) (providing a complete definition of
“pollutant”). Further, a “point source” is defined as “any discernable, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, [or]
tunnel . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” CWA § 502(14); 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14).
55. See CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77
(1977)) (observing that “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that
discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source” (alteration in original)).
56. Id. at 27.
57. CWA § 402; 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
58. CWA § 404(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). “Wetlands are an important subset of
the ‘waters of the United States’ that section 404 protects,” and section 404 is often
referenced as the “wetlands program.” CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 113.
59. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 113, 118 (explaining that the EPA is
responsible for compliance and enforcement of the CWA and all permit
requirements).
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Corps permit decision.60 Some regulated individuals and businesses
dislike these CWA permit requirements because compliance is timeconsuming and costly.61 Further, failure to comply can result in civil
and criminal liability, which carries the potential for hundreds of
thousands of dollars in fines.62
Ultimately, the CWA delegates authority to the EPA and the Corps
to regulate “navigable waters,” which Congress defined as “waters of
the United States, including territorial seas.”63 Although Congress
did not define what constitutes “waters of the United States,” it
granted the Agencies the authority to define these “waters” further
with regulations.64 The key question for establishing whether a body
of water or a wetland falls within CWA jurisdiction is whether it is a
“water of the United States” as defined by the Agencies’ regulations.65
Thus, uncertainty regarding the appropriate definition of “waters of
the United States” has created confusion “as to when a person does
or does not need [a section 402] NPDES or [s]ection 404 permit to
discharge pollutants.”66
Historically, there has been consensus that the CWA protects
traditional navigable waters, or waters that were used, are presently
used, or could be used for commerce, and waters “subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide.”67 For example, the Corps has found Three Rivers
in Pittsburgh, PA; Yellowstone River in Billings, MT; and the Mississippi
River to be traditional navigable waters.68 This interpretation derives

60. Id. at 118–19.
61. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“The
average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in
completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends
313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design changes. . . .
‘[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the private and public sectors obtaining
wetlands permits.’” (quoting David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of
Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland
Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 81 (2002))).
62. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (codifying enforcement provisions for the CWA).
63. CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
64. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2015) (defining “waters of the United States” for the
Corps); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (defining “waters of the United States” for the EPA).
65. See CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (regulating discharge into “navigable
waters” defined as “waters of the United States”).
66. Allyson C. Chwee, Note, United States v. Cundiff: Sixth Circuit Decision Makes
Rapanos v. United States Controversy (Navigable) Water Under a Bridge, 43 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 233, 242 (2009).
67. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 38.
68. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM
INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK 17–18, 20 (2007) [hereinafter CORPS’ GUIDEBOOK],
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from the Corps’ authority to regulate navigable waters under the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act (“RHA”), dating back to the 1890s.69
However, the CWA’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress
did not intend for the interpretation of “waters of the United States”
to be strictly limited to navigable-in-fact waters.70 The Committee on
Public Works House Report explained that
[o]ne term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the
term “navigable waters.” The reluctance was based on the fear that
any interpretation would be read narrowly. However, this is not the
Committee’s intent. The Committee fully intends that the term
“navigable waters” be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation, unencumbered by agency determinations which
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes.71

A Senate-House Conference Committee Report, the FWPCA
Conference Report, and the floor debate of both the House and
Senate also support this broad interpretation of the CWA.72 This
legislative history “links the statutory jurisdiction of the CWA to the
constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate waters
and water pollution, leaving both matters to be addressed in the
future by the federal courts.”73
B. Development of Agency Regulations and the Court’s Interpretation of
CWA Jurisdiction
Federal courts have considered the regulatory definition of “waters
of the United States” on several occasions. After Congress granted
the Corps the authority to implement and enforce the CWA in 1972,
the Corps issued regulations that defined “navigable waters” using the
definition for “traditional navigable waters” in the RHA.74 In 1975,

http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/jd_gu
idebook_051207final.pdf.
69. Id. at 50. See generally Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/riv1899.h
tml (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) (discussing the RHA’s history).
70. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12 & nn.9–11.
71. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 131 (1972).
72. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12 & n.10 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at
144 (1971) and H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131); Keith, supra note 45, at 574 (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)).
73. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12.
74. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 38 (explaining that the RHA defined “navigable
waters” to be “only those waters that were navigable in the traditional sense:
navigable in fact (used in commerce), navigable in the future with reasonable
improvements, navigable in the past, and subject to the ebb and flow of the tide”).
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the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia invalidated the
Corps’ regulation due to its unduly narrow interpretation of the term
and held that jurisdiction under the CWA should encompass more
than traditional navigable waters.75 Specifically, the Court held that
the Corps should interpret jurisdiction to “the maximum extent
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”76
Consequently, courts began applying jurisdiction more broadly after
this case, finding that CWA jurisdiction extended to more than just
traditional navigable waters and using legislative intent and history to
ascertain the permissible scope of jurisdiction under the CWA.77
In 1977, the Corps promulgated a regulation that defined “waters
of the United States” to include not only navigable waters but also
wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters and their
tributaries—waters that flow directly or indirectly into traditional
navigable waters—as well as “other waters” that “could affect
interstate commerce.”78 Although environmentalists were content
with this regulatory definition, property owners challenged the
Corps’ jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands” in a case that eventually
made its way to the Supreme Court.79
That 1985 case, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., was the
first in which the Supreme Court reviewed the scope of the Agencies’
regulations under the CWA. It concerned wetlands adjacent but not
connected to Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan,80 and the
Court considered whether the term “navigable waters” permitted
CWA jurisdiction over such “adjacent wetlands.”81 A unanimous
Court deferred to the Corps’ determination that adjacent wetlands
that border or “are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the
United States” are “inseparably bound up” with these “waters.”82

75. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
76. Id.
77. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 14 (indicating that one CWA law casebook
even stated in 1998 that “by now, little serious dispute remains over the necessity for
either a § 402 or 404 permit for discharges into any water”).
78. Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144
(July 19, 1977) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323) (defining “waters of the United States”).
The Corps first promulgated interim final regulations in 1974 and later refined the
definition of “wetlands” in 1977. Keith, supra note 45, at 575.
79. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 39.
80. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
81. Id. at 126.
82. Id. at 134 (first quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977)). Further, the Court
refused to distinguish CWA jurisdiction between “wetlands” and “waters.” See id. at
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Further, the Court affirmed that the CWA’s definition of “‘navigable
waters’ as ‘waters of the United States’ makes it clear that the term
‘navigable’ . . . is of limited import,” and that Congress intended the
CWA to regulate at least some waters that would not be considered
traditionally navigable.83
Thus, the Court upheld the Corps’ regulation and held that the
Corps had not exceeded its authority by including wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters in its definition of “waters of the United States.”
Consequently, the Court determined that wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters were “navigable waters” within the Agencies’
jurisdiction under the CWA.84 However, the Court declined to
address whether federal regulatory jurisdiction extends to “wetlands
that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.”85
Following the Court’s unanimous opinion in Riverside Bayview, the
Corps revised and reorganized its regulations in 1986.86 The Corps
did not change the definition of “waters of the United States”;
however, the Corps added preamble language to clarify jurisdiction
over “isolated waters,” which became known as the Migratory Bird
Rule.87 The Migratory Bird Rule gave the Corps the authority to
regulate activities in isolated waters, such as wetlands, that “are or
would be used as habitat by . . . migratory birds which cross state
lines.”88
The Agencies used this preamble language to gain

133 (declaring that “it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term ‘waters’ to
encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined”).
83. Id. at 132–33.
84. Id. at 133–34, 139 (concluding that it was “reasonable for the Corps to
interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass [adjacent] wetlands”).
85. Id. at 131 n.8.
86. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 44 (explaining that the Corps separated its
definition of “waters of the United States” into its own part in the regulations).
87. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,216–17 (Nov. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Migratory Bird Rule]; GARDNER, supra
note 16, at 44.
88. Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217. In the Rule, the Corps clarified
that “waters of the United States” includes intrastate waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory
Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
Id. This Rule was not a regulation and was issued by the Corps without following the
notice-and-comment procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(2012). Thus, courts regarded it as an interpretive rule, and therefore did not afford
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jurisdiction over “isolated waters,” upsetting many landowners who
questioned the extent of the Agencies’ jurisdiction under the CWA.
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of CWA
jurisdiction over isolated waters. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”), a waste
management company challenged federal authority over an
abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois that provided a
habitat for migratory birds.89 Initially, the Corps concluded that it
did not have jurisdiction over the site due to the lack of “wetlands”
that the Court found to be jurisdictional under the CWA in Riverside
Bayview.90 However, the Corps later claimed jurisdiction, stating that
the site contained “waters of the United States” solely because it
provided a habitat for migratory birds.91
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Migratory Bird
Rule exceeded the scope of authority granted to the Corps under
section 404(a) of the CWA.92 The Court determined that the Corps
could not extend the definition of “navigable waters” to “isolated”
non-navigable intrastate ponds used by migratory birds.93 The Court
based its ruling on the statutory construction of the CWA without
reaching the question of whether the Corps had the constitutional
authority to regulate isolated waters.94
The Court clarified that the difference between SWANCC and
Riverside Bayview was the “significant nexus” between the “navigable
waters” and the waters in question.95 In Riverside Bayview, the
wetlands “actually abutted on a navigable waterway,” whereas in
it as much deference as they would have an agency regulation. GARDNER, supra note
16, at 46–47.
89. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 162, 164 (2001) (“The Corps found that approximately 121 bird species had
been observed at the site, including several known to depend upon aquatic
environments for a significant portion of their life requirements.”).
90. Id. at 164 (noting the lack of wetlands or support for vegetation typically
found near water).
91. Id. The Corps used the following criteria for its determination: “(1) the
proposed site had been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; (2) the water areas
and spoil piles had developed a natural character; and (3) the water areas are used as
habitat by migratory bird [sic] which cross state lines.” Id. at 164–65.
92. Id. at 174.
93. Id. at 171.
94. Id. at 173–74. The Court reviewed the statutory construction of “navigable”
and viewed Congress’s intention for jurisdiction to be grounded in “its commerce
power over navigation.” Id. at 168 n.3.
95. See id. at 167 (emphasizing the presence of a “‘significant nexus’ between the
wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” in Riverside Bayview).
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SWANCC the waters were not directly connected.96 While the Court
affirmed that the word “navigable” was of “limited import,” it
declared that it is not the case that the word “navigable” has “no
effect whatever.”97 Ultimately, the Court found no legislative history
indicating that Congress contemplated CWA jurisdiction over
isolated waters and rejected the Corps’ attempt to use the Migratory
Bird Rule to regulate isolated, non-navigable, intrastate waters that
had no connection to a navigable waterway.98
Following SWANCC, the Agencies temporarily considered revising
their regulations.99 Although the Court struck down the preamble
language (the Migratory Bird Rule), its decision did not affect the
Agencies’ definition of “waters of the United States” in the 1986
regulations.100 However, in December 2003, the Agencies issued
notice that there would be no new rulemaking.101 After SWANCC,
several litigants challenged the Agencies’ jurisdiction over “waters”
that were neither isolated nor directly adjacent to traditional navigable
waters.102 Subsequently, lower courts struggled to determine whether
the CWA granted the Agencies jurisdiction over wetlands that were
adjacent to non-navigable tributaries103 of navigable waters, such as
those depicted below in Figure 1.104

96. See generally id. at 167–68 (explaining that for the Corps to prevail, the Court
“would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not
adjacent to open water”).
97. Id. at 172 (asserting that the word “navigable” shows “what Congress had in
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA”).
98. Id. at 170–71.
99. Margaret “Peggy” Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands Are
Regulated? Jurisdiction of the §404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,372, 10,377 (2010).
100. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 19.
101. Strand & Rothschild, supra note 99, at 10,377. In lieu of rulemaking, the
Agencies issued a joint guidance legal memorandum that explained the Agencies’
position of CWA jurisdiction following SWANCC. Id.
102. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 15.
103. “A non-navigable tributary of a traditional navigable water is a non-navigable
water body whose waters flow into a traditional navigable water either directly or
indirectly by means of other tributaries.” EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN
WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS
V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES 6 (2008) [hereinafter RAPANOS
GUIDANCE], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_j
urisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf.
104. See Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the United
States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7–8
(2006) (discussing the inconsistency of the CWA’s application following SWANCC in
the federal courts of appeals); CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 15.
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Figure 1: Adjacent Wettlands
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determined that the landowner’s wetlands were jurisdictional under
the CWA—and thus could not be filled without a permit—because
“there were hydrological connections between [the wetlands] and
corresponding adjacent tributaries of navigable waters.”112
The Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus, issuing a plurality
opinion with a 4-1-4 split among the Justices.113 Five Justices voted to
vacate the Sixth Circuit decision, and the Court remanded both
cases, holding that the Corps failed to apply the correct standard to
establish jurisdiction over these wetlands as “waters of the United
States” under the CWA.114 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality,
determined that “waters of the United States” under the CWA
includes only “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of
water.”115 The plurality explained that “waters of the United States”
refers more to flowing “bodies forming geographic features such as
oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.”116
The plurality acknowledged that the CWA allows jurisdiction in
certain circumstances over “navigable waters . . . other than those
waters” which are or could be used “as a means to transport interstate
or foreign commerce,” such as “adjacent wetlands.”117 Ultimately,
Justice Scalia explained that “adjacent” wetlands include “only those
wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters
of the United States’” such that there is no clear separation between
“where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”118 According to
the plurality, if the wetland is not “relatively permanent” and has no
“continuous surface connection” with a traditional navigable water,
the wetland is not jurisdictional under the CWA.119

112. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 643.
113. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 718 (showing that four Justices joined in the plurality
opinion, one Justice concurred in the judgment, and four Justices dissented).
114. Id. at 757.
115. Id. at 732 (emphasis added). Further, Justice Scalia specified that CWA
jurisdiction does not include “channels through which water flows intermittently or
ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.” Id. at 739.
116. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
117. Id. at 731, 742 (alteration in original) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)).
118. Id. at 742 (second emphasis added). Thus, the Court reasoned that
“[w]etlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to
‘waters of the United States’ do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of
Riverside Bayview, and . . . lack the necessary connection to covered waters that [the
Court] described as a ‘significant nexus’ in SWANCC.” Id. (citing Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001)).
119. Id. at 742.
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Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, agreed that the cases
should be remanded but disagreed that a “continuous surface
connection” was the appropriate standard for determining whether
wetlands constitute “waters of the United States.”120 Justice Kennedy
concluded that the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands “depends on the
existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and
navigable waters in the traditional sense.”121 He stated that “wetlands
possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory
phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”122 Further, if the
wetlands were found to be “speculative” or “insubstantial,” then they
would not be found jurisdictional under the CWA.123 While the
Corps could presume jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to truly
navigable waters,124 Justice Kennedy specified that adjacency to a nonnavigable tributary will not establish jurisdiction without a greater
ecological connection.125
Further, Justice Kennedy explained that the Corps could choose to
identify “categories of tributaries that[,] due to their volume of flow
(either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or
other relevant considerations,” have a “significant nexus” with
navigable waters.126 However, in the absence of regulations, Justice
Kennedy directed the Corps to proceed on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether it had authority to regulate wetlands based on their
adjacency to non-navigable tributaries. He also suggested that, in the
interest of administrative efficiency or necessity, the Corps might
have presumptive jurisdiction over similar wetlands in the region.127
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, criticized both Justice
Kennedy and the plurality for “[r]ejecting more than [thirty] years of
practice by the Army Corps.”128 He concluded that on remand “each
120. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 780.
123. Id.
124. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985)
(holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters were considered jurisdictional
under the CWA).
125. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 781.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that the Corps’
“decision to treat these wetlands as encompassed within the term ‘waters of the
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of the judgments should be reinstated if either [Justice Kennedy’s or
the plurality’s test] is met.”129 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer
each wrote separately and urged the Corps to promulgate rules to
redefine “waters of the United States.”130
Despite the Court’s lack of consensus, Rapanos is the closest
guidance for properly interpreting the scope of CWA jurisdiction.131
However, because Rapanos did not garner a majority opinion, two
competing tests for establishing CWA jurisdiction have emerged from
the Court’s decisions.132 The first test, established in Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion, provides for CWA jurisdiction for “relatively
permanent” waters with a “continuous surface connection” between
the wetland and other “waters of the United States.”133 The second
test, articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, provides for
jurisdiction if a “significant nexus” exists between a wetland and
other “waters of the United States.”134 To date, courts at both the
district and appellate levels have wrestled with which test to apply.135
C. Deciphering the Correct Standard to Apply Post-Rapanos
Since Rapanos, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have failed to agree
about whether the plurality’s opinion or Justice Kennedy’s opinion
provides the controlling standard.136 The circuit courts have found
United States’ is a quintessential example of the Executive’s reasonable
interpretation of a statutory provision.” Id. (citing Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
129. Id. at 810.
130. Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (referencing the Agencies’ failure to
promulgate guidelines following SWANCC, which would have received “deference
under [the Court’s] generous standards”); id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. See infra Sections I.C–D (discussing the courts’ and Agencies’ interpretations
of CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos).
132. Kristen Clark, Comment, Navigating Through the Confusion Left in the Wake of
Rapanos: Why a Rule Clarifying and Broadening Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act Is
Necessary, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 296–97 (2014).
133. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion).
134. Id. at 779–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. One district court judge even stated, “I am so perplexed by the way the law
applicable to this case has developed that it would be inappropriate for me to try it
again.” United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2007); see
also United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (reviewing a case on existing precedent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and essentially ignoring Rapanos because the case “leaves no guidance
on how to implement its vague, subjective centerpiece”).
136. See Memorandum from Dick Pedersen, President, Envtl. Council of the
States, to Whom It May Concern 7, 8 (Sept. 11, 2014) [hereinafter ECOS Memo],
http://acoel.org/file.axd?file=2014%2f9%2fWaters+of+the+U+S+Final+9_11_14.pdf
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CWA jurisdiction for wetlands that meet only Justice Kennedy’s standard
or wetlands that meet either standard.137 However, no federal court of
appeals has held that the plurality’s standard alone is controlling.138 The
Supreme Court has denied each petition for review requesting the
Court to clarify the scope of CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos.139
1.

Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: Justice Kennedy’s test controls
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all held that Justice Kennedy’s opinion provides the
controlling standard from Rapanos.140 Each of these courts reasoned
that the “significant nexus” standard was the “narrowest ground”—
the least restrictive ground—upon which Rapanos could be
interpreted.141 The circuit courts determined that Justice Kennedy’s
test would “classify a water as ‘navigable’ more frequently than the
plurality’s test.”142 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits explained that it
would be rare for a wetland to meet the plurality’s test and not meet
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.143 In most cases in which the
plurality would find jurisdiction due to a “surface-water connection,”
Justice Kennedy would also find a “significant nexus.”144 However, the
circuit courts acknowledged the potential for a rare case in which the
plurality would find jurisdiction over a surface-water connection so
“remote” that a “significant nexus” would not be found under Justice
(discussing how lower courts have struggled to interpret the Supreme Court’s
plurality decision in Rapanos).
137. Id. at 8–13. Additionally, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and District
of Columbia Circuits have refrained from making a decision as to which standard
controls. Id. at 13.
138. Chwee, supra note 66, at 264.
139. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 21.
140. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008); United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208,1222
(11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. McWane, Inc., 555 U.S. 1045
(2008); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 810 (2007).
141. N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999; Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1222; Gerke
Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25. The circuits used Marks v. United States to interpret
the holding of the plurality opinion in Rapanos. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). The Supreme
Court held in Marks that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
142. Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1221.
143. Id. at 1223; Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25.
144. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25.
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Kennedy’s test.145 Regardless of this rare possibility, the courts agreed
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided the “least common
denominator” between all of the fragmented opinions in Rapanos and
is the controlling standard for establishing CWA jurisdiction.146
2.

First, Third, and Eighth Circuits: Either the plurality’s or Justice
Kennedy’s tests may be used
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits
have reasoned that neither test controls, and that courts may use
either the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus”
test to determine whether wetlands fall under the jurisdiction of the
CWA as “waters of the United States.”147 The First Circuit disagreed
with the reasoning of the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.148
The First Circuit emphasized the scenario in which the plurality’s test
would find jurisdiction based on a remote surface connection but
Justice Kennedy’s test would not.149 Thus, the court concluded that if
Justice Kennedy’s test controlled, “there would be a bizarre
outcome . . . [in which] the court would find no federal jurisdiction
even though eight Justices . . . would all agree that federal authority
should extend to such a situation.”150
For this reason, the First Circuit decided that it was more logical to
follow Justice Stevens’s approach in the Rapanos dissent, which would
hold that the “United States may elect to prove jurisdiction under

145. Id.
146. Id. at 725; see also N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999–1000 (explaining that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence “[is] the narrowest ground to which a majority of the
Justices would assent if forced to choose in almost all cases”); Robinson, 505 F.3d at
1221–22 (finding that the “significant nexus” test in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is
the controlling test).
147. United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2409 (2012); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948 (2007).
148. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 61–64. The First Circuit concluded that the standard
from Marks did not translate to Rapanos. Id. at 64. The court reasoned there are
several other plausible interpretations of “narrowest ground” and concluded that an
opinion is “narrower” “only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader
opinions.” Id. at 63. Ultimately, the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits concluded that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was not a logical subset of the plurality’s opinion
because there is a case when the plurality would find jurisdiction and Justice Kennedy
may not. Donovan, 661 F.3d at 181; Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799; Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
149. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
150. Id. In this hypothetical situation, the court notes that the Rapanos plurality
and dissenters could agree about jurisdiction to form the eight Justice majority. Id.
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either test.”151 Under Justice Stevens’s approach, the court explained,
jurisdiction exists “where a majority of the Court would support such
a finding.”152 Subsequently, the Third and Eighth Circuits followed
suit, holding that “federal regulatory jurisdiction can be established
over wetlands that meet either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test
from Rapanos.”153
D. Post-Rapanos Regulation and the Agencies’ Development of the Clean
Water Rule
After Rapanos, the Agencies issued joint guidance documents that
interpreted the scope of the “waters of the United States” in light of
the Court’s opinion.154 The Agencies asserted that “water” would fall
under the jurisdiction of the CWA if it met either the plurality’s
standard or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.155 The
guidance documents identified categories of waters that remained
jurisdictional, categories that were not jurisdictional, and categories
that would require case-specific analysis as required by Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos.156 The Agencies used
case-specific analysis to review waters that did not meet the plurality’s
standard of a continuous surface connection and did not fit evenly
into any other category of jurisdiction. Thus, these “waters” needed
closer examination to determine if a “significant nexus” was present
for CWA jurisdiction.157
Ultimately, many CWA permit applications fell into this category
and required lengthy and burdensome case-specific review to
determine whether a “significant nexus” was present with a “water of
the United States.”158 Despite the Agencies’ attempt to clarify the

151. Id. (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 n.14 (2006) (Stevens,
J., dissent)) (“I assume that Justice Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most
cases because it treats more of the Nation’s waters as within the Corps’ jurisdiction,
but in the unlikely event that the plurality’s test is met but Justice Kennedy’s is not,
courts should also uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction.”).
152. Id.
153. Donovan, 661 F.3d at 182 (emphasis added); Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799.
154. Strand & Rothschild, supra note 99, at 10,377 (detailing that the Agencies
first issued joint guidance in June 2007; however, they later reissued this guidance in
December 2008).
155. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 19–20.
156. Strand & Rothschild, supra note 99, at 10,378.
157. RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 12.
158. COPELAND, R43943, supra note 3, at 1; see also Clark, supra note 132, at 297
(describing the administrative burden and taxing nature of conducting case-specific
analysis to establish CWA jurisdiction).
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scope of CWA jurisdiction with guidance documents, the regulated
public was still confused about which “waters” constituted “waters of
the United States” and when a permit was required to discharge
pollutants into these “waters.”159 In 2011, the Agencies attempted to
issue another guidance document to make the “case-by-case analysis
of ‘significant nexus’ waters more clear”; however, they never
published the final guidance.160
As a result of this confusion, businesses, environmental groups,
landowners, and even the Supreme Court urged the Agencies to
promulgate rules that would increase uniformity and consistency in the
CWA permit process.161 Finally, in 2014, the Agencies responded to
these pleas and jointly issued a proposed rule to clarify the definition of
“waters of the United States.”162 After receiving over one million public
comments, the Agencies published the final rule in June 2015, titled
“Clean Water Rule: Definition of ‘Waters of the United States.’”163
In August 2015, the Rule went into effect replacing the Agencies’
existing guidance documents.164 The goal of the Rule is to “clarify
the scope of ‘waters of the United States’ that are protected under
the” CWA and make the process of identifying these “waters” easier to

159. See Clark, supra note 132, at 297 (discussing the Agencies’ inability to provide
sufficient clarification with guidance documents following Rapanos).
160. Id. at 308–09.
161. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (criticizing the proposed rulemaking following SWANCC, which “went
nowhere”); id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging the Agencies to “write new
regulations, and speedily so”); EPA Requests, supra note 27 (listing requests for
rulemaking from business associations, environmental groups, and landowners); see
also Stephen M. Johnson, The Rulemaking Response to Rapanos: The Government’s Best
Hope for Retaining Broad Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 22, 33 (L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007) (explaining that
agency rulemaking allows for increased reliability when interpreting statutes and
increased public participation due to the notice and comment requirements under
the Administrative Procedure Act). However, agencies often prefer to issue guidance
documents over rulemaking because there are fewer procedural requirements, and
agencies can adopt or change policy more quickly with guidance than with
rulemaking. Id. at 31–32.
162. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79
Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
163. 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and
scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
164. See supra note 30 (explaining that the North Dakota District Court’s Order
enjoined implementation of the Rule in thirteen states). The Sixth Circuit has also
stayed enforcement of the Rule nationwide pending its decision on the merits. See
supra note 34 (mentioning the stay on the Rule’s implementation issued in October
2015).
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understand and more predictable.165 The Agencies rely on a
comprehensive scientific report titled Connectivity of Streams &
Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review & Synthesis of the Scientific
Evidence (“Science Report”) to provide a scientific basis for
determining connections between certain categories of water in the
Rule.166 The Science Report is “based on a review of more than 1,200
peer-reviewed publications” and concludes that “waters fall along a
gradient of chemical, physical, and biological connection to
traditional navigable waters, and it is the [A]gencies’ task to
determine where along that gradient to draw lines of jurisdiction
under the CWA.”167 Using the Science Report, legal analysis, and
practical experience, the Agencies categorized jurisdictional waters as
waters that possess a “significant nexus” with “traditional navigable
waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas.”168
The Rule maintains the general structure of the Agencies’ definition
in existing regulations and follows the same categorical breakdown of
waters in the Agencies’ guidance documents.169 Similarly, the Rule
includes three categories of jurisdiction: (1) “[w]aters that are
jurisdictional in all instances,” (2) “waters that are excluded from
jurisdiction,” and (3) “a narrow category of waters subject to case-specific
analysis to determine whether they are jurisdictional.”170 The Rule
defines “waters of the United States” as follows:

165. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055; see also COPELAND, R43943, supra
note 3, at 1 (explaining that the Final Rule was meant to condense and streamline
jurisdictional determinations and to minimize case-specific review).
166. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EPA/600/R-14/475F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM
WATERS: A REVIEW & SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2015) [hereinafter
SCIENCE REPORT], http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=296414&C
FID=41777546&CFTOKEN=20401943). The Agencies also issued a Technical
Support Document, which is a 423-page document that addresses the legal basis and
existing scientific literature supporting the “significant nexus” determinations in the
Rule. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DEP’T OF THE ARMY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT FOR THE CLEAN WATER RULE: DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
(2015) [hereinafter TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT], http://www.epa.gov/sites/pro
duction/files/2015-05/documents/technical_support_document_for_the_clean_wat
er_rule_1.pdf. This Comment takes the Science Report at face value and analyzes
the Rule with the presumption that the Report is valid.
167. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057.
168. Id. The Rule also notes that “[i]f evolving science and the [A]gencies’
experience lead to a need for action to alter the jurisdictional categories, any such
action will be conducted as part of a rule-making process.” Id. at 37,058.
169. COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 2.
170. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057.
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(1) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may
be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters, including interstate wetlands;
(3) The territorial seas;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise identified as waters of
the United States under this section;
(5) All tributaries . . . of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (3) of this section;
(6) All waters adjacent to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (5) of this section, including wetlands, ponds, lakes,
oxbows, impoundments, and similar waters.171

The Rule also includes two categories of waters in sections (a)(7)
and (a)(8) that the Agencies must consider on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether a “significant nexus” connection exists.172 These
new sections allow the Agencies to determine whether a “significant
nexus” connection is present with these waters alone, or in
combination with other similarly situated waters.173 Section (a)(7) of
the Rule lists five specific types of “waters” that the Science Report
has found “function alike and are sufficiently close to function
together in affecting downstream waters.”174 Accordingly, the Rule
requires the Agencies to consider these “waters” together when

171. Id. at 37,104 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(6)). This section of 33
C.F.R. Part 328 and all further citations in this Comment to 33 C.F.R. Part 328 also
appear in 40 C.F.R. Parts 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401 as
outlined in the Final Rule. Id. at 37, 106–27.
172. Id. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)–(8)).
173. Id. at 37,058–59.
174. TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 331. Clean Water Rule, 80
Fed. Reg. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)) (emphasis added) includes
[a]ll waters in paragraphs (a)(7)(i) through (v) of this section [defined as
Prairie potholes, Carolina bays and Delmarva bays, Pocosins, Western vernal pools,
and Texas coastal prairie wetlands] where they are determined, on a casespecific basis, to have a significant nexus to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (3) of this section. The waters identified in each of paragraphs
(a)(7)(i) through (v) of this section are similarly situated and shall be combined,
for purposes of a significant nexus analysis, in the watershed that drains to
the nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.
Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined with waters
identified in paragraph (a)(6) of this section when performing a significant
nexus analysis. If waters identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent
water under paragraph (a)(6), they are an adjacent water and no casespecific significant nexus analysis is required.
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determining whether a “significant nexus” exists with another “water
of the United States” listed in sections (a)(1)–(3).175
Further, section (a)(8) identifies additional waters that the
Agencies will also consider on a case-by-case basis.176 Unlike section
(a)(7), section (a)(8) requires Agency officials to determine whether
the “waters” should be combined for the “significant nexus”
analysis.177 These waters include (1) “waters located within the 100year floodplain[178] of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (3),” and (2) “all waters located within 4,000 feet of the high
tide line or ordinary high water mark of a water identified in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (5).”179
Next, the Rule specifies waters that will not be considered “waters of
the United States.”180 Some of these waters include waste treatment
systems, prior converted cropland, certain artificial water features—
such as reflecting pools—three types of ditches, erosional features,
puddles, groundwater, and storm water control features.181

175. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058–59.
176. Id. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8)) (“All waters located within
the 100-year floodplain of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this
section and all waters located within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high
water mark of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section
where they are determined on a case-specific basis to have a significant nexus to a
water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.”).
177. Id. Specifically, the Rule provides,
For waters determined to have a significant nexus, the entire water is a water
of the United States if a portion is located within the 100-year floodplain of a
water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section or within 4,000 feet of
the high tide line or ordinary high water mark. Waters identified in this
paragraph shall not be combined with waters identified in paragraph (a)(6)
of this section when performing a significant nexus analysis. If waters
identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent water under paragraph
(a)(6), they are an adjacent water and no case-specific significant nexus
analysis is required.
Id. (emphasis added).
178. “The ‘100-year floodplain’ is the area with a one percent annual chance of
flooding.” TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 124.
179. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105. The Rule defines “high tide line”
as the “line of intersection of the land with the water’s surface at the maximum
height reached by a rising tide.” Id. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(7)).
180. Id. at 37, 105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)).
181. Id. For the complete list of excluded “waters,” see id.
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The Rule also defines several terms for the first time, including
Most
“tributary,” “neighboring,” and “significant nexus.”182
importantly, the Rule defines “significant nexus”:
Significant nexus. The term significant nexus means that a water,
including wetlands, either alone or in combination with other
similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affects the
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a water identified in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. . . . For an effect to
be significant, it must be more than speculative or insubstantial.
Waters are similarly situated when they function alike and are
sufficiently close to function together in affecting downstream waters. For
purposes of determining whether or not a water has a significant
nexus, the water’s effect on downstream paragraph (a)(1) through
(3) waters shall be assessed by evaluating the aquatic functions . . .
of this section. A water has a significant nexus when any single
function or combination of functions performed by the water,
alone or together with similarly situated waters in the region,
contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or biological
integrity of the nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (3) of this section.183

The Rule’s preamble explains that “[t]he scope of jurisdiction in
this [R]ule is narrower than that under the existing regulation.”184 It
further notes that “[f]ewer waters will be defined as ‘waters of the
United States’ under the rule than under the existing regulations.”185
Nevertheless, the Rule has created significant controversy among
“regulated entities[, which] have criticized the Agencies for
overreaching and expanding CWA jurisdiction.”186 This Comment
182. Id. at 37,073. For full definitions of these terms, see id. at 37,105–06
(codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(2), (3), (5)).
183. Id. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(5)) (emphasis added).
Further, a significant nexus evaluation involves consideration of the following
relevant functions:
(i) Sediment trapping, (ii) Nutrient recycling, (iii) Pollutant trapping,
transformation, filtering, and transport, (iv) Retention and attenuation of
flood waters, (v) Runoff storage, (vi) Contribution of flow, (vii) Export of
organic matter, (viii) Export of food resources, and (ix) Provision of life
cycle dependent aquatic habitat (such as foraging, feeding, nesting,
breeding, spawning, or use as a nursery area) for species located in a water
identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.
Id.
184. Id. at 37,054.
185. See id. (explaining that the Rule reduces jurisdiction by expanding regulatory
exclusions and defining certain terms that were previously undefined).
186. See Andrea M. Hogan et al., What to Know About the “Waters of the United States”
Rule, LAW360 (July 6, 2015, 1:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/674520/wha
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addresses one allegation, among many, namely whether the Rule
“expand[s] CWA jurisdiction beyond historical coverage and U.S.
Supreme Court precedent.”187
II. THE CLEAN WATER RULE PROPERLY INTERPRETS CWA
JURISDICTION AND COMPORTS WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Clean Water Rule was a response to hundreds of requests for
clarification on the scope of “waters of the United States.” In the
Rule, the Agencies have used a combination of science, technical
expertise, and practical experience to establish when a “significant
nexus” is always present with certain categories of “waters.” These
“waters” are considered per se jurisdictional under the CWA.
Further, the Rule creates two categories of “water” where jurisdiction
must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. This Part analyzes the Rule
and argues that it is permissible under Supreme Court precedent.
Moreover, the Rule provides the public with additional clarity on the
scope of federal jurisdiction by defining terms previously undefined,
providing bright-line delineations, and creating per se categories that
will help to streamline agency review.
A. The Rule Adopts Justice Kennedy’s “Significant Nexus” Test
The Final Rule adopts and incorporates Justice Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” test into its definition of “waters of the United
States.”188
While there is no unanimous agreement that his
concurrence in Rapanos is controlling, courts have generally accepted
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as the “best instruction on
the permissible parameters of ‘waters of the United States.’”189 While
t-to-know-about-the-waters-of-the-united-states-rule (listing potential legal challenges
that the Rule would face following its implementation).
187. Id.
188. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054, 37,104–08 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts
of 40 C.F.R.); see, e.g., Christopher D. Thomas, Defining “Waters of the United States”: A
Mean-Spirited Guide, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2015, at 33 (noting that the
Final Rule and its preamble mention the phrase ‘significant nexus’ 438 times in
comparison to the phrase “relatively permanent” from the plurality’s standard, which
is mentioned only twice).
189. In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Cundiff,
555 F.3d 200, 208–10 (6th Cir. 2009)). In its October 2015 Order staying
implementation of the Clean Water Rule nationwide, the Sixth Circuit noted that
“[t]here are real questions regarding the collective meaning of the Court’s
fragmented opinions in Rapanos.” Id. at 807 n.3. However, even the parties
challenging the Rule have accepted the Agencies’ interpretation of CWA jurisdiction
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the Agencies used both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s tests to
establish jurisdiction following Rapanos,190 the Rule incorporates
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard into the new definition
of “waters of the United States.”191 The Rule explains that each
category of jurisdictional water must have a “significant nexus” with
traditional navigable waters.192 In the Rule, the Agencies define
“significant nexus” for the first time and redefine the categories of CWA
jurisdiction using the “significant nexus” test.193 The Agencies used the
Science Report and their own expertise to identify six categories of
waters, listed in sections (a)(1)–(6), that are per se jurisdictional because
there will always be a “significant nexus” between these types of waters
and traditional navigable water.194 Further, the Rule establishes two
categories of “waters” in sections (a)(7) and (a)(8) that the Agencies
must consider on a case-specific basis to determine if a “significant
nexus” is present to justify CWA jurisdiction.195
The Rule’s definition of “significant nexus” expounds on Justice
Kennedy’s framework of what may constitute a “significant nexus” in
Rapanos. In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he required
nexus must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes,”
which Congress specified were “to ‘restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”196
Similarly, the Rule’s definition of “significant nexus” specifies that a

using Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. Id. at 807. Further, both the
Agencies and all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals following Rapanos have
acknowledged Justice Kennedy’s test as the requisite standard. See TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 41 (explaining agreement between all of the
Circuit Courts of Appeal that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard should
be considered when determining jurisdiction under the CWA). For more discussion,
entire scholarly articles have been devoted to the analysis of interpreting a
controlling opinion from Rapanos. See generally Chwee, supra note 66 (analyzing how
courts should apply the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s standard in Rapanos).
190. See RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 3 (announcing that the Agencies
will find CWA jurisdiction if either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is met).
191. Id. at 7.
192. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057.
193. See id. at 37,068, 37,073 (finding categorical jurisdiction for all tributaries and
adjacent waters based on scientific findings that these waters have a “significant
nexus” connection with traditional navigable waters).
194. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (citing the sections of the Rule that
provide for per se CWA jurisdiction).
195. See supra notes 172–79 and accompanying text (citing and explaining the
types of waters that may be considered jurisdictional on a case-by-case basis).
196. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
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“significant nexus means that a water . . . significantly affects the
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a water.”197
Further, in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy identified factors such as
“volume of flow” and “proximity to navigable waters,” which the
Agencies may view as “relevant considerations” to determine whether
adjacent wetlands have a “significant enough” connection to navigable
waters to be jurisdictional under the CWA.198 Accordingly, the Rule’s
definition incorporated similar factors to evaluate the presence of a
“significant nexus.”199 While the Agencies defined “significant nexus”
officially for the first time, the factors codified in the Rule’s definition
are the same factors that the Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied
nationwide following Rapanos to establish a “significant nexus.”200
Hence, the presence of these factors in the Rule’s definition should
come as no surprise to CWA permit seekers and lower court judges.
While Justice Kennedy specified that CWA jurisdiction depended on a
“significant nexus” connection, he acknowledged that the Agencies
could further define this standard, which is precisely what the Agencies
have done.201 Although the Agencies do not specifically articulate
that they have adopted Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, they
have implicitly adopted his test as the requisite standard to establish
CWA jurisdiction by incorporating the test into each category of
jurisdictional water in the Rule.202
197. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c)(5)).
198. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
199. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c)(5)(vi)) (incorporating other factors, such as sediment trapping, nutrient
recycling, runoff storage, contribution of flow, and export of organic matter).
200. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 44–45 (listing the types
of functions used by federal circuit courts to evaluate a “‘significant nexus’ with a
downstream traditionally navigable water”). For example, courts have considered
“water storage capacity,” Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 603 F.
App’x 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2015); “contribution of flow,” United States v. Donovan, 661
F.3d 174, 186 (3d Cir. 2011); “runoff,” United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210–11
(6th Cir. 2009); “nutrient recycling,” Donovan, 662 F.3d at 186; “pollutant trapping or
filtering,” Donovan, 662 F.3d at 186, United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th
Cir. 2008); “export of organic matter,” Donovan, 662 F.3d at 186; and “fish and
wildlife habitat,” N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000–01
(9th Cir. 2007).
201. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781–82 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referencing the
Agencies’ ability to specify with “regulations or adjudication”); see also Thomas, supra
note 188, at 33–34 (hypothesizing that the Agencies “prepared the administrative
record with the belief that Justice Kennedy might someday be the fifth vote to
uphold the rule”).
202. Thomas, supra note 188, at 33.
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The definition of “significant nexus” and the incorporation of the
“significant nexus” test into the Rule’s categories of CWA jurisdiction
will help streamline review and make regulation of the CWA more
consistent. Prior to the Rule, the Agencies’ guidance documents
explained that the Agencies could evaluate waters for a “significant
nexus” connection; however, the documents presented no uniform
standard for doing so to the regulated public.203 The absence of a
definition led to inconsistency not only among Agency decisions but
also in the standard courts used to evaluate challenges to permit
decisions.204
Thus, to implement the “significant nexus” test
consistently, the Agencies needed a uniform definition to clarify what
constituted a “significant nexus.” By incorporating the “significant
nexus” standard into categories of waters that the Agencies will
consider per se jurisdictional,205 the Rule will help streamline Agency
review by eliminating burdensome and time-consuming case-by-case
analyses for these waters.
Despite this benefit, critics of the Rule have argued that the
Agencies have impermissibly expanded CWA jurisdiction by defining
“significant nexus” more broadly to include “waters that would
previously have been out of reach.”206 However, the Agencies have
adopted the definition based on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Rapanos and have codified the Agency standards used in practice.207
If anything, the Rule’s definition should provide assurance to permitseekers that the Agencies will apply the standard more consistently

203. See RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 1, 8 (indicating the factors that will
be taken into consideration when determining the presence of a “significant nexus”
without further detail).
204. See, e.g., Precon, 603 F. App’x at 151 (declaring that “the significant nexus test
is a ‘flexible ecological inquiry’”); Cundiff, 555 F.3d at 211 (declaring laboratory
analysis “is [not] the sole method by which a significant nexus may be proved”);
United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006)
(declaring the ambiguity of “significant nexus” in Rapanos when the court reflected,
“exactly what is ‘significant’ and how is a ‘nexus’ determined?”).
205. See supra text accompanying note 171 (listing sections (a)(1)–(6) of the Rule
and explaining the types of “waters” that will be considered per se jurisdictional).
206. Christopher H. Dolan & Olivia D. Lucas, Unsettled Waters: Clean Water Rule
Challenges Remain, LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2015, 12:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articl
es/701635/unsettled-waters-clean-water-rule-challenges-remain
(alteration
in
original) (explaining that many of the industry and agriculture sectors interpreted
the Rule as a significant expansion of the waters the Agencies could regulate within
their CWA jurisdiction).
207. RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 9 (announcing how the Agencies will
apply the “significant nexus” test to establish CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos).
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nationwide.208 Therefore, by adopting Justice Kennedy’s framework
and promulgating a definition for “significant nexus,” the Agencies
have provided increased clarity to the regulated public and have
adhered to the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction articulated by
Justice Kennedy in Rapanos.
B. The Rule Incorporates the “Significant Nexus” Test into Three Categories
of CWA Jurisdiction
The Rule’s definition of “waters of the United States” includes
three broad categories of jurisdiction for waters protected under the
CWA.209 These categories include (1) “[w]aters that are jurisdictional
in all instances,” (2) “waters that are excluded from jurisdiction,” and
(3) “a narrow category of waters subject to case-specific analysis to
determine whether they are jurisdictional.”210 While the Rule retains
this general categorical structure from the Agencies’ guidance
documents, the Rule primarily affects a few portions of the definition
in existing regulations.211 “Tributaries” and “adjacent waters” are now
considered per se jurisdictional based on new definitions for these
waters,212 and the category formerly called “other waters” is now two
categories of “waters” that the Agencies must review on a case-by-case
basis.213 Despite public concern over these changes, the Rule
comports with Supreme Court precedent.
1.

Waters that are per se jurisdictional
The Rule identifies “waters” that will always be considered
jurisdictional under the CWA. The per se jurisdictional “waters” are
further divided into six subcategories: (1) traditional navigable

208. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054, 37,095 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40
C.F.R.) (explaining how the Rule provides “clear and consistent parameters” for
Agency officials and “transparency to the regulated public over which factors will be
considered”).
209. Id. at 37,057.
210. Id. The Rule explains that the Agencies will alter these categories, if needed,
to reflect any changes in the evolving science around water classifications or the
Agencies’ own experience implementing the Rule. Id. at 37,058.
211. See Thomas, supra note 188, at 34 (analyzing that the “Final Rule most notably
tinkers with the language in three areas of major concern”).
212. The Rule did not change the primary definition of “adjacent”; however, it
defined the term “neighboring,” which is included in the definition of “adjacent
waters,” for the first time. Hogan et al., supra note 186.
213. Id.
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waters, (2) interstate waters, (3) territorial seas, (4) impoundments of
jurisdictional waters, (5) tributaries, and (6) adjacent waters.214
The first four subcategories of per se “waters” have been
traditionally classified as jurisdictional under the CWA.215 The Corps
has had federal authority over traditional navigable waters tracing
back to the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, which
granted the Corps authority to regulate discharge into “navigable
waters” that were used or could be used for commerce.216 Further,
the Agencies’ jurisdiction over interstate waters (waters that cross
state lines) has historically been part of the Agencies’ regulations,
and Congress’s definition of “navigable waters” in the CWA explicitly
includes jurisdiction over “the territorial seas.”217 The Supreme
Court has also recognized CWA jurisdiction over impoundments of
jurisdictional waters—waters in sections (a)(1)–(3) that have been
dammed.218 Accordingly, the Rule does not make any changes to
CWA jurisdiction for these subcategories.219
The fifth subcategory, tributaries, also comports with Supreme
Court precedent. Federal jurisdiction over tributaries is not novel;
however, the Rule “makes tributaries . . . that share a ‘significant
nexus’ to ‘waters of the United States’ jurisdictional by rule.”220

214. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058, 37,104 (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(1)–(6)).
215. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 370 (2006)
(upholding jurisdiction over dammed water as a “waters of the United States”);
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985) (upholding
the Corps’ regulation, which established CWA jurisdiction over traditionally
navigable waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas).
216. See supra note 43 (explaining the history of the RHA). More examples of
traditional navigable waters under CWA jurisdiction include Great Salt Lake in Utah
and Lake Minnetonka in Minnesota. RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 5 n.20.
217. See CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012)) (“The term ‘navigable waters’
means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”); 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(a)(2)(1985) (establishing jurisdiction for “[a]ll interstate waters including
interstate wetlands”).
218. See S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 379 n.5 (clarifying that one cannot avoid
jurisdiction by damming or impounding a “water of the United States”); see also
Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,075 (same).
219. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3; 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2) (“Existing regulations (last codified in 1896) define ‘waters of the United
States’ as traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, all other waters that could
affect interstate or foreign commerce, impoundments of waters of the United States,
tributaries, the territorial seas, and adjacent wetlands.”).
220. Hogan et al., supra note 186; see Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 129 (“The
[1975] regulation extends the Corps’ authority under § 404 to all wetlands adjacent
to navigable or interstate waters and their tributaries.”); TECHNICAL SUPPORT
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Previously, the Agencies regulated all tributaries without
restriction.221 The Rule’s key change to the regulation of tributaries
is that the Agencies define “tributary” for the first time, and thus,
some tributaries that previously may have been considered on a caseby-case basis are now considered per se jurisdictional.222 The Rule
defines “tributary” as a “water that contributes flow, either directly or
through another water . . . that is characterized by the presence of
the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water
mark.”223 Further, a “tributary” can be natural, man-made, or manaltered and does not lose its status if it has constructed or natural
breaks, such as “wetlands, along the run of a stream, debris piles,
boulder fields, or a stream that flows underground.”224
The Rule’s definition for “tributary” is consistent with Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.225 As Justice Kennedy specified, a
“significant nexus” connection to navigable or potentially navigable
water must be present for CWA jurisdiction.226 The Rule’s definition
of “tributary” requires physical indicators of a “bed and banks” and
an “ordinary high water mark”227 to ensure the presence of sufficient

DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 24 (referencing the Corps’ 1975 interim regulations
that “defined navigable waters for the purposes of the [CWA] to include nonnavigable tributaries”).
221. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058.
222. See Deborah Freeman & Steve Dougherty, New Clean Water Act Rule Defining
Waters of the United States, 44 COLO. LAW. 43, 44 (2015) (explaining that intermittent
tributaries were previously considered “other waters” and were considered on a caseby-case basis); Hogan et al., supra note 186 (mentioning that the Rule’s definition for
tributaries “removes a distinction in the [Agencies’] 2008 guidance between
permanent and intermittent tributaries”); supra notes 171, 182 and accompanying
text (citing the Rule and describing the new definitions).
223. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c)(3)).
224. Id. at 37,105–06. A tributary may also be considered jurisdictional if “it
contributes flow through a water of the United States” to a traditionally navigable
water. Id. at 37,106.
225. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 31 (explaining that
while Justice Kennedy specifically referred to a “significant nexus” with adjacent
wetlands in Rapanos, the “significant nexus” test is not solely limited to application
with “adjacent wetlands”).
226. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
227. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c)(6)). An “ordinary high water mark” is defined as the “line on the shore
established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by the physical characteristics
such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank, shelving, [and] changes in the
character of soil.” Id. at 37,106.
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and regular “volume, frequency, and duration of flow” of water.228
Hence, the Agencies defined “tributary” to include physical
characteristics that demonstrate either consistent surface flow or
other biological or chemical connections to downstream navigable
waters.229 These physical characteristics ensure that jurisdictional
tributaries possess the requisite “significant nexus” connection with
traditional navigable waters so that jurisdiction is consistent with the
permissible scope of the “waters of the United States” that the
Supreme Court outlined in Rapanos.230
The allegation that the Rule’s per se jurisdiction over tributaries
does not satisfy the “significant nexus” test misinterprets Justice
Kennedy’s opinion.231 Justice Kennedy only expressed concern with
tributaries that did not have a “significant nexus” connection.232 He
also did not express any disfavor with categorical jurisdiction once
Although Justice
the Agencies had undergone rulemaking.233
Kennedy concluded that a “significant nexus” must be present to
establish jurisdiction, he stipulated that the Agencies could “choose
to identify categories of tributaries [through regulations or
adjudication] that, due to their volume of flow,” are “significant

228. See id. at 37,105–06 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(3)); TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 69–72 (defining “tributary” to include waters where
there is evidence of a “strong influence on the physical, chemical, and biological
integrity of downstream waters” consistent with the CWA’s statutory objective).
229. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076; see also TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 70 (explaining the Agencies’ process for identifying
and concluding that these types of connections were “significant enough” for CWA
jurisdiction).
230. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779, 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting
jurisdiction over “waters” that “carry only insubstantial flow” or otherwise have no
connection to navigable waters).
231. See First Amended Complaint at 14–16, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015
WL 5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (alleging the Rule’s per se jurisdiction over
tributaries exceeds the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction).
232. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern
with the Corps establishing jurisdiction over uncertain “surface water connections”
and his conclusion that the “presence of a hydrologic connection . . . [a]bsent some
[other] measure” of the “significance of the connection” between the tributaries and
navigable-in-fact waters was insufficient to establish CWA jurisdiction); see also
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 67 (explaining that Justice
Kennedy “did not raise concerns with the [A]gencies’ existing jurisdiction over
tributaries themselves”).
233. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780, 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
Agencies may “presume covered status for other comparable wetlands [as a matter of
administrative convenience]”).
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enough” to be considered jurisdictional.234 This is exactly what the
Agencies have done: the Agencies have used Justice Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” standard to define “tributary” in a manner whereby
the tributaries’ features will demonstrate the requisite “nexus” for
jurisdiction.235 Essentially, pursuant to Rapanos, once an Agency finds a
“significant nexus,” CWA jurisdiction is appropriate. Therefore, the
Agencies’ decision to establish this jurisdiction with a per se definition
comports with the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos.236
Moreover, the claim that the categorical jurisdiction of “tributaries”
violates the plurality’s standard for a “continuous surface connection”
under Rapanos is inconsequential.237 No court has held that the
plurality’s standard is the primary standard for determining CWA
jurisdiction after Rapanos.238 In fact, the courts that have considered
the plurality’s standard have used it in combination with Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.239 Thus, if a “water” satisfied either
test, the courts upheld CWA jurisdiction.240 Therefore, if waters meet
the definition of “tributary” in the Rule, the fact that a court may not
find jurisdiction under the plurality’s test is irrelevant because a
tributary is jurisdictional under the “significant nexus” test.241

234. Id. at 780–81.
235. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 70–71 (explaining the
scientific analysis used to determine the presence of a “significant nexus” with
navigable waters).
236. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 783 (emphasizing that the “significant-nexus test itself
prevents problematic applications of statute”).
237. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 14, Ass’n of Am. R.R.s
v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015) (claiming that the Rule asserts
jurisdiction over “water features that do not constitute a ‘continuous surface
connection’”); First Amended Complaint at 16, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015
WL 5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015). The Rule explains that tributaries with
intermittent flow may still possess a “significant nexus” with traditional navigable
waters to be considered jurisdictional under the CWA. Clean Water Rule: Definition
of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,079 (June 29, 2015)
(codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
238. Chwee, supra note 66, at 264.
239. See supra Section I.C (explaining the different courts of appeals
interpretations of CWA jurisdiction under Justice Kennedy’s opinion or the
plurality’s opinion).
240. See id. (demonstrating that the plurality’s “surface-water connection” standard
was always considered with Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard; thus, if a
connection was only found under Justice Kennedy’s standard, that was sufficient for
CWA jurisdiction).
241. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058 (clarifying that the Rule only
covers tributaries “that meet the significant nexus standard”).

ALLIONE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE BATTLE OVER U.S. WATER

10/31/2016 8:03 PM

183

Ultimately, any finding that a water does not meet the plurality’s test in
no way contravenes the Supreme Court’s holding in Rapanos.
The sixth subcategory, “adjacent waters,” is also consistent with
Rapanos.
The Rule changes existing jurisdiction in Agency
regulations from per se jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands” to per se
jurisdiction over “adjacent waters.”242 The Rule keeps the existing
definition of “adjacent wetlands” and reclassifies it as the definition
for “adjacent waters.”243 “Adjacent waters” include “all waters
bordering, contiguous to, or ‘neighboring’”244 jurisdictional waters in
sections (a)(1)–(5),245 including waters separated by constructed or
natural barriers, such as dikes or beach dunes.246
The per se jurisdiction of “adjacent waters” in lieu of “adjacent
wetlands” does not impermissibly expand CWA jurisdiction beyond
the scope of the CWA that the Supreme Court has already outlined in
its previous cases.
While Riverside Bayview specifically upheld
jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands,” the Court had to determine
whether the Corps could reasonably interpret the term “navigable
waters” under the CWA to include “adjacent wetlands.”247 Congress’s
specific use of the term “navigable waters” indicates that the CWA has
always had jurisdiction over “waters.”248 Nevertheless, some critics
have viewed the Rule’s change in terminology from “wetlands” to
“waters” as an impermissible expansion of CWA jurisdiction.249
Specifically, the concern is that the Rule expands per se jurisdiction

242. Hogan et al., supra note 186.
243. Id.
244. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified as 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c)(2)) (defining “neighboring” waters to include “all waters located within
100 feet of the ordinary high water mark,” “within the 100-year floodplain,” and
“within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a water in [sections] (a)(1) or (a)(3)”).
245. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (citing Rule sections (a)(1)–(5)
establishing jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, territorial
seas, impoundments, and tributaries).
246. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c)(1)).
247. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985)
(considering the “wetlands” question without any debate about the inclusion of
traditional “waters”).
248. CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012) (defining “navigable waters”
under the CWA); Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133 (acknowledging Congress’s intent
to cover “navigable waters”).
249. Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 45.
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to “waters” that were previously considered on a case-by-case basis and
therefore may not have been found jurisdictional.250
However, whether a “water” is a “wetland” or a body of water that is
adjacent to a “water of the United States” listed in sections (a)(1)–
(a)(5) of the Rule should not affect the determination of CWA
jurisdiction where a “significant nexus” connection is present.251
Justice Kennedy specified that “[a]bsent more specific regulations,”
the Agencies “must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case
basis . . . to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to non[-]navigable
tributaries.”252 A literal interpretation of this sentence suggests that
once the Agencies promulgate specific regulations, case-by-case
analysis is no longer necessary. Moreover, the Agencies have followed
Justice Kennedy’s suggestion to develop more specific regulations—
the Rule—to mitigate against the need for ongoing case-by-case
analysis.253 The Rule confirms that “adjacent waters” jurisdictional
under the Rule are “physically, chemically, and biologically
integrated with downstream traditional navigable waters.”254
Therefore, the Rule does not expand jurisdiction over any surface
waters that would not have been found to have a “significant nexus”
under an individual case-specific review.
The Agencies have
jurisdiction over these “adjacent waters” regardless of whether they
continue to evaluate the waters on a case-by-case basis or create a rule
that establishes per se jurisdiction over the waters.
Further, the Rule’s new definition of the term “neighboring”
includes distance limitations, which provide when the Agencies may

250. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 17, Ass’n of Am. R.R.s
v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015) (claiming that the Rule’s
jurisdiction over all “adjacent waters” violates the permissible scope of CWA
jurisdiction in Rapanos); First Amended Complaint at 17, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv79, 2015 WL 5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (arguing that the expansion of per se
coverage exceeds the Agencies’ authority under the CWA).
251. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing Justice Kennedy’s sole focus upon “the existence of a
significant nexus” connection to establish CWA jurisdiction).
252. Id. at 782.
253. Id. (detailing that the Agencies could “presume covered status for other
comparable wetlands [as a matter of administrative convenience]”).
254. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 275–79 (explaining
how these waters “can significantly affect downstream traditional navigable waters,
interstate waters, or the territorial seas”); id. at 162 (indicating that the Science
Report also supports finding “adjacency” on the basis of functional relationships
“rather than solely on the basis of geographical proximity to jurisdictional waters”).
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deem waters per se jurisdictional as “adjacent waters.”255 Despite
concerns about federal overreach, the distance limitations do not
expand jurisdiction of “adjacent waters” beyond the scope that the
Court outlined in Riverside Bayview and Rapanos.256 The Court has
repeatedly acknowledged the boundary-drawing problem that the
Agencies have faced in establishing the scope of jurisdiction based on
adjacency.257 In both Riverside Bayview and Rapanos, the Court noted
that when the Agencies define the outer limits of CWA jurisdiction,
the Agencies “must necessarily choose some point at which water
ends and land begins.”258 In the Rule, the Agencies have concluded
that functional relationships sufficient to establish a “significant
nexus connection” with navigable waters occur within these
distances.259 As such, the Agencies have used reasonable judgment to
determine the outer limit of jurisdiction for “adjacent waters,” a task

255. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054, 37,105 (June 29, 2015) (codified as 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1)–(2))
(defining “adjacent” waters to include “neighboring” waters and defining
“neighboring” waters to include “[a]ll waters located within 100 feet of the ordinary
high water mark,” “within the 100-year floodplain,” and “within 1,500 feet of the high
tide line of a water”). There is pending litigation alleging that the distance
limitations included in the Rule violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553, because these limitations were not included in the Proposed Rule. Jonathan
H. Adler, Sixth Circuit Puts Controversial “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) Rule on
Hold, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/09/sixth-circuit-puts-controversial-wat
ers-of-the-united-states-wotus-rule-on-hold. Notwithstanding this argument, which
will not be addressed in this Comment, the distance limitations alone do not mean
that a “significant nexus” may not be found between these waters and a traditional
navigable water so that jurisdiction would be appropriate.
256. But see Dolan & Lucas, supra note 206 (expressing some critics’ concern over
many borderline waters “being immediately swept in under over-broad definitions”
using the “significant nexus” standard).
257. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742–43 (plurality opinion) (noting that Agencies
have found it troublesome to determine adjacency based on ecological
considerations); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132
(1985) (explaining the difficulty of defining the bounds of regulatory authority for
adjoining waters).
258. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132); Riverside
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132 (recognizing that “[w]here on this continuum [between
open waters and dry land] to find the limit of ‘waters’ is far from obvious”).
259. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 298–305 (discussing the
research and agency expertise that suggest waters within 100 feet “perform critical
processes and functions”). The Science Report recognizes that distance is not the
only factor “that influences connections”; however, it does confirm that “waters”
within these distance ranges are in a position to “individually and collectively affect
the integrity of downstream waters.” Id. at 295–96.
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that the Court recognized was not only necessary but also extremely
difficult.260 Presumably under Justice Kennedy’s standard, if a
“significant nexus” is found with a traditional navigable water,
jurisdiction would be appropriate regardless of the distance from the
outer limits of the “waters” listed in sections (a)(1)–(5).261 Therefore,
the per se definition of “adjacent waters” and the incorporation of
distance limitations into the Rule’s definition does not exceed the
scope of permissible CWA jurisdiction that the Court outlined in
Riverside Bayview and Rapanos.
Overall, the Agencies have provided the regulated public with
additional clarity about the scope of CWA jurisdiction by defining
what constitutes a “tributary,” including “adjacent waters” as a per se
category, and establishing bright-line boundaries of jurisdiction for
these “waters.” Previously, all tributaries, which were undefined, were
either jurisdictional or considered on a case-by-case basis.262 Thus, by
defining “tributary,” the Agencies have given the public a precise
definition so the public can better understand what “tributaries” will
be considered jurisdictional under the CWA.263
Additionally,
following Rapanos, many “adjacent waters” still required a lengthy and

260. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,081 (explaining that the Agencies
have “established boundaries that are, in their judgment, reasonable and consistent
with the statute”). Further, the Rule’s adoption of distance limitations can be
distinguished from the “complacent acceptance” of distance limitations critiqued by
the plurality in Rapanos due to the scientific substantiation in the Science Report.
Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 746 (“Riverside Bayview . . . provides no support for the
dissent’s complacent acceptance of the Corps’ definition of ‘adjacent,’ which . . . has
extended beyond reason to include . . . the 100-year floodplain of covered waters.”),
with TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 294–305 (finding that waters
within these distances are “integrally linked to the chemical, physical, or biological
functions of waters to which they are adjacent and downstream to the traditional
navigable waters”).
261. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 783–85 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (announcing that
“as exemplified by SWANCC, the significant-nexus test itself prevents problematic
applications of the statute”). In SWANCC, the Court emphasized that “[i]t was the
significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” that permitted
jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001). Thus, presumably, if a “significant nexus”
had been present in SWANCC, the Court would have found the isolated ponds to be
within CWA jurisdiction regardless of their distance with navigable water.
262. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058 (explaining that the existing
regulations regulated “all tributaries without qualification”). See supra note 222 and
accompanying text (describing the Agencies’ former distinction between
intermittent and permanent tributaries).
263. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,079 (describing the physical
characteristics that must be present for CWA jurisdiction over a “tributary”).
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time-consuming case-by-case analysis.264 The new Rule includes
“adjacent waters” in the former per se category of “adjacent
wetlands,” and the public has the “bright-line boundaries” it
requested during the notice and comment period to limit federal
regulation over these “waters.”265 These per se categories will not
only clarify the Agencies’ regulations but will also help streamline
Agency review of permit applications and provide more consistent
regulation of the CWA to the benefit of both the Agencies and the
regulated public.266
2.

Waters that are not jurisdictional: Exclusions
The Rule maintains all of the Agencies’ “regulatory exclusions,”
which enumerate the waters that will not be considered “waters of the
United States.”267 In fact, compared with existing regulations, the
Rule expands the list of exclusions, thereby reducing the scope of
CWA jurisdiction.268 The Agencies have explained that “[a]ll existing
exclusions from the definition of ‘waters of the United States’ are
retained, and several exclusions reflecting longstanding [A]gencies’
practice are added to the regulation for the first time.”269 Some of
these new bright-line exclusions include erosional features (such as
gullies), artificial reflecting pools, groundwater, puddles, and three
types of ditches.270
The Agencies’ failure to exclude all ditches from CWA jurisdiction
falls within the Rapanos Court’s interpretation of the scope of the
CWA. The Rule redefines and clarifies the type of ditches that are
excluded from CWA jurisdiction, and in certain circumstances, a ditch
may be considered jurisdictional.271 Specifically, a ditch will fall under

264. Hogan et. al, supra note 186.
265. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057 (referencing many comments
urging the Agencies to provide more bright-line boundaries to make it easier to
identify jurisdictional “adjacent waters”).
266. See id. at 37,056 (discussing how “case-specific jurisdictional analysis . . . can
result in inconsistent interpretation of CWA jurisdiction”).
267. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text (specifying the waters codified
at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) that will not be considered “waters of the United States”).
268. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055. The Rule also excludes “some
waters that were previously considered jurisdictional on a case-specific basis.”
Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 45.
269. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073.
270. Id. at 37,098 (listing the regulatory exclusions that have been added or
modified).
271. Id. at 37,078, 37,097.
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CWA jurisdiction if it meets both (1) the definition of “tributary”272 and
(2) is not one of the three types of ditches that are expressly excluded
in the Rule.273 This exclusion has been one of the most controversial
provisions of the Rule among regulated industry groups.274
The Rule explains when the Agencies may consider ditches
jurisdictional. To be held jurisdictional, a ditch must meet the
definition of “tributary,” and, as previously discussed, that definition
includes physical characteristics, such as an “ordinary high water
mark,” which demonstrate the presence of a “significant nexus”
connection with navigable waters.275 The Science Report expresses
how perennial, intermittent, or ephemeral streams may have a
“significant nexus” connection with traditional navigable water.276
Under the Rule’s definition, isolated ditches without a “significant
nexus” connection, or ditches with only a shallow hydrologic linkage
to navigable water, are not jurisdictional.277 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s
concerns about the Agencies establishing CWA jurisdiction over these
types of tenuous surface connections are not at issue. Ultimately, if
the ditch qualifies as a “tributary” and possesses a “significant nexus,”
it meets Justice Kennedy’s standard for CWA jurisdiction in
Rapanos.278

272. A ditch will fall under CWA jurisdiction when it (1) has “a bed and banks and
ordinary high water mark” and (2) “contribut[es] flow directly or indirectly through
another water to a traditional navigable water, interstate water, or territorial seas.”
Id. at 37,078.
273. Id. The types of ditches that are excluded are ditches that are not excavated
in a tributary, do not relocate a tributary, and do not drain a wetland. Id. at 37,105
(codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(3)).
274. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15, Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v.
EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015) (claiming that the Rule’s jurisdiction
over certain ditches violates the scope of CWA jurisdiction as discussed in Rapanos).
275. See supra notes 220–41 and accompanying text (explaining how the Agencies
used Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard to define “tributary” in a manner
that it will possess the requisite “nexus” for jurisdiction); see also Clean Water Rule, 80
Fed. Reg. at 37,098 (discussing why ditches that relocate streams are not excluded
and how a ditch can affect the “natural functions performed by wetlands”).
276. See Clear Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076 (clarifying how “tributaries
regardless of flow duration are very effective at transporting pollutants
downstream . . . which impact the integrity and character of traditional navigable
waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas”); Technical Support Document,
supra note 166, at 259–60.
277. See id. at 37,078 (noting that ditches must meet the definition of “tributary,
having a bed and banks and ordinary high water mark, and contributing flow directly
or indirectly through another water to a traditional navigable water”).
278. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (holding that “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of
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Current beliefs that the Agencies’ regulation of ditches violates
Supreme Court precedent appear to take Justice Kennedy’s opinion
out of context. Petitioners currently challenging the Rule’s validity
have cited Justice Kennedy’s concern about the expansion of CWA
jurisdiction to cover ditches that are isolated from navigable-in-fact
waters or carry insubstantial surface flow to these navigable waters as
indicative of his disapproval of CWA jurisdiction over all types of
ditches.279 However, this is not the case. Justice Kennedy did not
express concern over regulating ditches in general. In fact, he
emphasized the plurality’s rejection of authority over “man-made
drainage ditches” as “dismissive of the interests asserted by the United
States in these cases.”280 His concern with isolated waters and waters
with “insubstantial flow” stemmed from the lack of a requisite “nexus”
to navigable water.281 At no point did Justice Kennedy indicate that a
shallow surface connection will never have a “significant nexus” for
CWA jurisdiction.282 He simply warned that a “mere hydrologic
connection” may be “too insubstantial” to establish the required
“nexus with navigable waters.”283 Yet, once the requisite “nexus” is
established, jurisdiction would be appropriate. Accordingly, the
Rule’s jurisdiction over ditches that qualify as “tributaries” adheres to
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Rapanos.
Moreover, the Rule’s express exclusions provide clear bright-line
categories to help the public understand the types of waters that will
never be considered jurisdictional under the CWA. While the

a significant nexus between the [waters] in question and navigable waters in the
traditional sense”). Further, ditches have been held to be jurisdictional by all of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 73
(listing decisions by the circuit courts of appeals that have held that “a man-made
ditch can be a ‘tributary’ of the downstream waters to which the ditch ultimately
contributes flow”).
279. See First Amended Complaint at 11, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015 WL
5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (raising Justice Kennedy’s concern that the
“Agency’s position would impermissibly ‘permit federal regulation whenever
wetlands lie alongside a ditch or drain, however remote and insubstantial, that
eventually may flow into traditional navigable waters’” (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
778 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
280. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 777 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
281. See id. at 784–86 (explaining that a “ditch could just as well be located many
miles from any navigable-in-fact water and carry only insubstantial flow toward it” so
“[a] more specific inquiry, based on the significant[-]nexus standard, is therefore
necessary”).
282. See id. at 784 (rejecting the determination of a “significant nexus” connection
from a “mere hydrological connection” without further review).
283. Id. at 784–85.
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Agencies did not exclude every ditch from jurisdiction, the Rule does
expressly exclude three types of ditches and several other types of
waters that were either previously considered jurisdictional on a caseby-case basis or were excluded in Agency practice but never expressly
excluded in the Agencies’ regulations.284 Therefore, the Agencies’
expansion of the “regulated exclusions” in the Rule should provide
the regulated public with additional clarity and reassurance about
which “waters” will never require CWA permits.285
3.

Waters to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the “significant
nexus” test
The last category includes two types of waters in sections (a)(7) and
(a)(8) of the Rule over which the Agencies may find jurisdiction after a
case-specific analysis;286 these categories also comport with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos. Prior to this Rule, most of these
“waters” fell under the category of “other waters” in existing
regulations.287 The Agencies have determined that these waters do not
always possess a “significant nexus” with traditional navigable waters
appropriate for per se jurisdiction, so the Agencies have decided that
these categories of waters must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.288
The first category in section (a)(7) includes five types of waters that
the Agencies have found to be “similarly situated”289 and must be
284. See supra note 273 (describing the types of ditches that will never be found
jurisdictional); Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 45 (explaining the changes
to exclusions in the Rule).
285. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054, 37,097 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40
C.F.R.) (noting that “[t]he majority of commenters requested that the [A]gencies’
ditch exclusion be clarified or broadened”). The Agencies also added an express
exclusion for “puddles,” and “farm ponds, log cleaning ponds, and cooling ponds to
the list of excluded ponds in the [R]ule based on public comments.” Id. at 37,099.
286. Id. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)–(8)).
287. Hogan et al., supra note 186 (explaining the change to this category in the
Rule).
288. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 331 (citing the Science
Report’s conclusion that “current science does not support evaluations of the degree
of connectivity for specific groups or classes of wetlands,” but “[e]valuations of
individual wetlands or groups of wetlands, however, could be possible through caseby-case analysis” (quoting Connectivity of Streams & Wetlands to Downstream Waters, EPA
(2015), at ES-4, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=296414&C
FID=67575455&CFTOKEN=91277579)).
289. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)). These waters include prairie potholes (shallow wetlands),
Carolina and Delmarva bays (shallow lakes, wetlands, and depressions), pocosins
(swamps in upland coastal region), western vernal pools in California (seasonal
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combined together for the purpose of analyzing whether a “significant
nexus” is present.290 If one “similarly situated” water is found to have a
“significant nexus” with a traditional navigable water, all of the “similarly
situated” waters in the region are considered to be jurisdictional.291
The second category in section (a)(8) consists of waters (a) within
the 100-year floodplain292 of a traditional navigable water, interstate
water, or territorial sea; or (b) all waters within 4,000 feet of the high
tide line293 or ordinary high water mark of one of these traditionally
jurisdictional waters.294 The Agencies may review the effect of these
waters either individually or together.295 Unlike the first category, this
category requires a determination of whether to combine the
“waters” for the Agencies’ “significant nexus” analysis.296
Justice Kennedy’s opinion permits the Rule’s case-specific
categories. In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy expressly stated that “the
[Agencies] must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis
when seeking to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to
nonnavigable tributaries.”297 The Rule specifies that the Agencies
must find a “significant nexus” on a case-by-case basis for these

depressional wetlands), and Texas coastal prairie wetlands. Id. at 37,105. The Rule
states that these “subcategories are similarly situated because they perform similar
functions and they are located sufficiently close to each other to function together in
affecting downstream waters.” Id. at 37,071. Accordingly, these waters are
“sufficiently near each other . . . to function as an integrated habitat.” Id.
290. Id. at 37,104 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)). Under the Rule, these
types of “waters” must be considered in “combination with all waters of the same
subcategory [e.g., only pocosins may be analyzed with other pocosins] in the region.”
Id. at 37,087 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 37,095. The region is “the watershed that drains to the nearest
traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas through a single
point of entry.” Id. at 37,091.
292. See supra note 178 (defining the “100-year flood plain” as “the area with a one
percent annual chance of flooding”).
293. The “high tide line” is the “line of intersection of the land with the water’s
surface at the maximum height reached by a rising tide.” Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(7)).
294. Id. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8)).
295. Id. at 37,095. The Agencies “have not determined that such waters are
categorically similarly situated,” so the Agencies will conduct a determination to see
whether they are “similarly situated” for the purpose of being combined. Id.
296. Id. Waters will be combined as “similarly situated” when they “function alike
and are sufficiently close to function together in affecting downstream waters.” Id.
297. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining that “this showing is necessary to avoid unreasonable applications of the
statute”).
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categories of water.298 Thus, these categories satisfy Justice Kennedy’s
requisite standard of review to properly establish CWA jurisdiction.
Further, the combination of “similarly situated” waters also adheres
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos. Justice Kennedy clearly
indicated that the “requisite nexus” would be met “if the wetlands
either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, [or] biological
integrity” of other “waters.”299 The Science Report concludes that
certain types of “waters” act together in regions and may significantly
affect traditional navigable waters.300 Using the Report’s findings of
“comparable” or “similarly situated” waters, the Agencies identified
which subcategories of “waters” they should review together when
assessing the presence of a “significant nexus.”301
Additionally, dispute over the Rule’s combination of “similarly
situated” waters in a region misconstrues Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
Specifically, the argument that the Agencies need to find a
“significant nexus” to each similarly situated water is incorrect.302
This is not the standard that Justice Kennedy proposed in Rapanos.303
Rather, in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy stated that the “requisite nexus”
would be met “if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect . . . other
covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”304 Ultimately, his
focus was the effect on the connection to “navigable water,” not
between each type of “water” found to be “similarly situated.”

298. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105–06 (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c)(7)–(8)).
299. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
300. TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 331 (explaining that
certain waters “have a similar influence on the physical, chemical, and biological
integrity of downstream waters and are similarly situated on the landscape”).
301. See id. at 330–49 (explaining the scientific analysis behind the categories of
waters that are considered “similarly situated” in the Rule).
302. See First Amended Complaint at 21, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015 WL
5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (arguing that the Rule “violates Justice Kennedy’s
test because Justice Kennedy would only permit the Agencies to assert jurisdiction over
a water that ‘significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
other covered waters,’” and that “Justice Kennedy’s test would not permit aggregation
of waters across amorphous ‘region[s],’ as the Rule asserts the Agencies will do”
(citations omitted) (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 717 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
303. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (focusing on a
“significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the
traditional sense” (emphasis added)).
304. Id. at 780 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy clearly indicated that “[w]here an
adequate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it may be
permissible as a matter of administrative convenience or necessity, to
presume covered status for other comparable wetlands in the region.”305
Agencies have made precisely this presumption: they have used the
Science Report to presume covered status for certain categories of
“waters” that the Report found to be “comparable” or “similarly
situated” once Agency officials have determined that a “significant
nexus” connection is present.306 In addition, the Rule follows Justice
Kennedy’s instruction to review this effect on a case-by-case basis.307
Evidently, these sections of the Rule follow Justice Kennedy’s
standard proposed in Rapanos.
Overall, the Rule’s case-specific categories clarify and limit the
application of the “significant nexus” test that could otherwise be very
broad. Without such categories, the Agencies could potentially find a
“significant nexus” with any traditional navigable water. That
potential breadth is the very issue that concerned many critics of the
Rule’s incorporation of Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.308
While there is disagreement over the distance limitations that the
Rule imposes, these limits provide some of the bright-line boundaries
that the regulated public requested from the Agencies and also serve
as a limit to federal jurisdiction of U.S. waters.309 Further, the specific
sections of the Rule that require case-specific analysis limit this
analysis to only these two types of “waters,” and this limitation will
allow Agency officials to apply the CWA more consistently and
provide clarity for those confused about CWA permit jurisdiction.
305. Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
306. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054, 37,095 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts
of 40 C.F.R.) (explaining that “[a] positive ‘significant nexus’ determination
would . . . apply to all similarly situated waters within the point of the watershed”).
307. See id. at 37,104–06 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)–(8)) (requiring casespecific review for categories (a)(7) and (a)(8)). Further, all of the courts of appeals
have agreed that a “nexus” may be formed by a non-navigable water alone or in
combination with other similarly situated waters in the region. TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 44. Thus, permit seekers should not be surprised by
this provision in the Rule.
308. Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 47 (expressing concern that the
“significant nexus” test is overly expansive and allows federal overreach for these
“waters”).
309. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,082 (noting requests for a “specific
floodplain interval or other limitation . . . to more clearly identify the outer limit”).
This Comment assumes that the science that has found these distance limitations to
be appropriate is valid.
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Ultimately, not only does the Rule provide more clarity about the
“waters of the United States,” but it also comports with the Supreme
Court’s precedent concerning the permissible scope of the CWA.
CONCLUSION
The Clean Water Rule is a response to hundreds of requests for
clarification on the scope of the “waters of the United States” under
the CWA. While the Rule has become extremely controversial due to
its per se jurisdiction of tributaries and “adjacent waters,” it does not
unilaterally expand the CWA or constitute federal overreach. The
Rule comports with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riverside
Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos. The Rule follows Justice Kennedy’s
framework of “significant nexus” in Rapanos and uses his criteria to
develop a Rule such that the Agencies may only find jurisdiction
when a “significant nexus” is present. Accordingly, the Rule is a
rational convergence, which reflects Congress’ intent, a combination
of Supreme Court precedent, the most recent science, Agency
practice, and public comments. While the Rule may not be the
easiest to decipher, it does address many of the regulated public’s
requests for greater clarity by defining previously undefined terms
and establishing bright-line boundaries. The public can use these
clarifications as a tool for guidance to better determine which waters
fall under CWA jurisdiction. Further, the Rule creates a structure for
streamlined review, which will lead to more consistent application of
the CWA to the benefit of both the Agencies and regulated public.
Overall, this Rule is what the public needs, and it provides a logical
definition of “waters of the United States” consistent with Congress’s
goal for the CWA. If smaller streams and wetlands that have an effect
on traditional navigable waters are not protected, individuals will be
able to discharge pollutants, undermining the purpose of the CWA.
Nevertheless, the Rule is currently subject to nationwide litigation,
and the future of the Rule remains uncertain.
The Rule will inevitably make its way to the Supreme Court for
review. With the recent passing of Justice Scalia, who vehemently
criticized expansive environmental and wetland regulation, the
Court’s new composition will likely impact the Rule’s fate. However,
the Agencies have followed the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction
that the Supreme Court outlined in its previous cases. Consequently,
the Court should uphold the Clean Water Rule.

